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Abstract—Large enterprises and organizations from both 
private and public sectors typically outsource a platform 
solution, as part of the Managed Security Services 
(MSSs), from 3rd party providers (MSSPs) to monitor and 
analyze their data containing cyber security information. 
Sharing such data among these large entities is believed to 
improve their effectiveness and efficiency at tackling 
cybercrimes, via improved analytics and insights.  
However, MSS platform customers currently are not able 
or not willing to share data among themselves because of 
multiple reasons, including privacy and confidentiality 
concerns, even when they are using the same MSS 
platform. Therefore any proposed mechanism or 
technique to address such a challenge need to ensure that 
sharing is achieved in a secure and controlled way. In this 
paper, we propose a new architecture and use case driven 
designs to enable confidential, flexible and collaborative 
data sharing among such organizations using the same 
MSS platform. MSS platform is a complex environment 
where different stakeholders, including authorized MSSP 
personnel and customers’ own users, have access to the 
same platform but with different types of rights and tasks. 
Hence we make every effort to improve the usability of 
the platform supporting sharing while keeping the 
existing rights and tasks intact. As an innovative and 
pioneering attempt to address the challenge of data 
sharing in the MSS platform, we hope to encourage 
further work to follow so that confidential and 
collaborative sharing eventually happens among MSS 
platform customers. 
Keywords—Cyber security, privacy, policy, 
information, data sharing, data anonymization, data 
sanitization, data encryption, managed security service, 
managed security service provider, large-scale enterprise, 
organization, architecture, design, component, diagram, 
use case, multi-tenant, cloud service 
I. BACKGROUND 
The enormous losses and damages due to malware attacks 
(e.g., WannaCry [1], NotPetya) and data breaches (e.g., 
Equifax Data Loss) in recent years have highlighted the 
importance of robust and agile cyber security. It was estimated 
by Detica/the UK Cabinet Office in 2011 that cybercrime 
costed the UK £27billion annually (about 1.8 per cent of 
GDP), of which £3billion came from citizens, £3billion from 
the government and a huge £21billion from companies [2]. 
The Norton report on cyber security for 2017 presents a 
shocking figure of £130billion cybercrime loss globally, of 
which £4.6billion was contributed by British internet users [3]. 
Sharing cyber threat information has been shown to 
increase the capacity of cybercrime prevention and detection. 
Two examples are the Flame and Conflicker malwares which 
were successfully tackled collaboratively by security and 
business enterprises [4].  
However, several barriers exist that make sharing cyber 
security information difficult among organizations of different 
sizes and different functionalities. These organizations, 
including large-scale enterprises and small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs), are not able or not willing to share data 
with each other because of privacy and confidentiality 
concerns, contractual obligations, and legal requirements; and 
also because the available technologies might not be able to 
ensure proper access control mechanisms. Not sharing means 
reduced visibility and understanding of the situation and 
makes collaborative data analytics difficult, but how to protect 
confidentiality while enabling collaboration is a challenging 
research topic. 
The project of Collaborative and Confidential Information 
Sharing and Analysis for Cyber Protection (C3ISP) [5], a 
European Commission Horizon 2020 research project, aims to 
address this challenge with innovative architectures and 
technologies. The project plans to provide a framework for 
secure and controlled information sharing that includes 
sanitization measures from anonymization up to homomorphic 
encryption; such framework also comprises specially crafted 
analytics for different cyber defense use cases. The C3ISP 
project considers a number of scenarios in which a common 
technological component or framework is applied in different 
scenarios. In this paper, we focus on the so-called ‘Enterprise’ 
scenario, which concerns how to enable confidential, 
collaborative and flexible data sharing among large-scale 
organizations and enterprises in both public and private 
sectors. This definition means that the term “Enterprise” in our 
paper does not include SMEs. Such large-scale entities 
typically outsource security services offered by 3rd party 
providers to defend and fight against cybercrimes. These 
security services are typically referred to as Managed Security 
Services (MSSs) and the 3rd party providers are typically 
referred to as Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs). 
One typical type of MSSs offered to customers is focused on 
monitoring and analyzing the customer’s data which contain 
cyber threat information and in this paper we focus on such a 
MSS. In principle, the greater the volume and variety of data 
available for analysis and correlation, the higher the quality of 
information. Thus combining the analysis of data from 
multiple customers has advantages to both customers and 
MSSPs. In this paper, we describe a novel architecture and use 
case driven designs, aiming at providing a confidential and 
collaborative sharing capability within the Enterprise MSS 
environment. 
Examples of such a MSS include BT Cyber Security [6], 
BT Security Threat Monitoring [7], SAP Enterprise Threat 
Detection [8], McAfee Enterprise Security Manager [9] and 
Alien Vault Unified Security [10].  MSSPs sometimes offer a 
Security Operations Centre (SOC) service to enterprises. SOC 
services can include a platform solution as the MSS for cyber 
threat monitoring and analytics for enterprises. The MSS 
platform is a centralized solution at the MSSP side, so it is a 
cloud service for the customers. Such a platform typically but 
not necessarily consists of a Data Lake, existing portals and 
tools. We consider the Data Lake as a distributed file system 
capable of storing huge amount of structured and unstructured 
data. The Data Lake which comprises data from individual 
customers, as well as instances of portals and tools are used by 
the cyber security analysts with contractual obligations at the 
MSSP side. In this paper, we refer to such a platform with 
these typical components as described above as a MSS 
Platform. 
A typical MSS platform works in the following way. A 
large variety of security data sources are ingested into the 
platform, normalized to comply with the platform’s common 
information model, enriched with contextualizing information 
and stored in the Data Lake. Data from the Data Lake are 
automatically/semi-automatically processed, monitored and 
analyzed using the Presentation & Analytics Tools (PAT) via 
a portal. PAT may write results back to the Data Lake, so the 
results data become available for further processing if 
required. The distinction between presentation tools and 
analytics tools is not hard and fast — for example, visual 
analytics tools combine aspects of both presentation and 
analytics. The results are made available to human decision-
makers, who are either the MSSP personnel, referred to in this 
paper as Security Analyst(s) or Data Policy Officer(s) (DPOs), 
who are assigned to represent the interests of the customer(s) 
in question; or the customer personnel, referred to as Security 
Operation Executive(s) (SOEs). Security Analysts working on 
the front lines may be only using the PAT to perform 
investigation or analytics on behalf of customers; Security 
Analysts working on the non-front lines may also design and 
implement new features or data policies for the related 
platform components to meet requirements from customers. 
The SOEs can use PAT to monitor or analyze their own data 
sources, but are not allowed to write to the MSS platform 
components to change or add features. If SOEs have feature 
requirements (e.g. modifying the existing features or adding 
new features), the SOEs need to pass their requests to the 
platform Security Analysts via the customer support or 
account managers. 
To allow collaborative and confidential data sharing using 
the MSS platform, a new architecture is needed and the design 
of the new architecture including the new components 
becomes a research challenge. The architecture requires novel 
approaches so that the current tasks can still be carried out 
without disruption, as well as allowing the MSS platform 
personnel to use the newly introduced  components and 
functionalities for carrying out confidential and collaborative 
analytics.  
Prior art and expertise are related to this project. As part of 
the same proposal call from EU Horizon 2020, another 
project, Proactive Risk Management through Improved Cyber 
Situational Awareness (PROTECTIVE) looks into how to 
improve cyber security incident and risk management using 
improved security monitoring and sharing for public domain 
computer security incident response teams and SMEs [11]. 
Coco Cloud was another EU project which aimed to allow 
cloud users to share data securely and privately in the cloud 
[12]. It was proposed that users of the cloud who are willing to 
share their data must consent to a Data Sharing Agreement 
(DSA), which requires uniform end-to-end enforcement [12]. 
We make use of the DSA developed by the Coco Cloud 
project, adapted for use within the C3ISP project.  
In the following sections, we present the new system 
architecture of the MSS platform integrating the Collaborative 
and Confidential Sharing Component, referred as the C3ISP 
Component, and subsequently present the more detailed 
component designs driven by three different use cases. The 
C3ISP component is the important module which protects and 
desensitize the shared data and provides additional analytical 
functions the existing MSS platform does not have, but 
describing detailed sharing techniques and mechanisms used 
within the C3ISP Component is beyond the scope of this 
paper. The architecture and use cases we present here focus on 
how to connect an existing MSS platform with the C3ISP 
Component and how to use the MSS platform with the C3ISP 
Component enabled.  
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The system architecture incorporating the new C3ISP 
Component, is illustrated in Fig. 1 using the Fundamental 
Modeling Concepts (FMC) block diagram notation [13].  
The MSS platform comprises components in three 
categories: the existing platform components (purple), the 
C3ISP Component including subcomponents (orange) and the 
new MSS platform software components (blue) which couple 
the existing platform components with the C3ISP Component.  
The existing platform components are the PAT and the 
Data Lake storing data from different customers and have 
been introduced in Section I. The C3ISP Component consists 
of three main subcomponents: The Information Sharing 
Infrastructure (ISI) for data sanitization and protected storage, 
the Information Analytics Infrastructure (IAI) for new and 
tailored analytical functions not provided by the existing MSS 
platform (e.g., performing operations on homomorphically 
encrypted data) and the Data Sharing Agreement Manager 
(DSAM) for defining policies for the IAI and ISI. DSAM is a 
powerful tool that transforms directives expressed in 
controlled natural language to machine-intelligible policies. A 
more detailed description of the C3ISP Component can be 
found here [14]. 
The new software components include the Portal, the 
Collaborative Task Manager (CTM) and the Data Manager 
(DM). CTM and DM act as “adapters” between existing 
components and the new C3ISP Component, in order to 
reconcile the expectations of existing components with the 
new analysis capabilities of the IAI or make use of the 
possibility to access sanitized data storage for shared data 
from participating customers. Detailed functionalities of the 
Portal, DM and CTM are introduced in the following 
subsections. 
A. The Portal 
The Portal is a front-end that will allow all the MSS 
platform users to call their respective functionalities and 
provide convenient links to the PAT, the CTM and the Data 
Sharing Agreement Manager (DSAM) within the C3ISP 
Component. As described earlier, the MSS platform already 
provides portals for users. However, the C3ISP Component 
being added to the platform means that new subcomponents 
will be added to the existing interfaces of the Portal or new 
interfaces of the Portal will be introduced. Hence the Portal is 
marked as a new component in the architecture design. The 
Portal will allow the Data Policy Officer (DPO) representing 
the customer on the MSSP side to write new data sharing 
policies into the DSAM or modify the existing sharing 
policies. It will also allow the MSS platform Security Analyst 
to enable or modify the configuration or task management 
functions provided by the CTM. From the customer side, the 
Portal will allow the SOEs to request the PAT but will not 
allow the SOEs to request CTM or the C3ISP Component; this 
is because the SOEs do not have the management rights on the 
MSS platform. 
B. The Data Manager 
The Data Manager (DM) mediates the interactions 
between the Information Sharing Infrastructure (ISI) of the 
C3ISP Component and other non-C3ISP components. The 
DM provides an Application Programming Interface (API) 
enabling it to match the PAT’s standard data query and 
formatting requirements (e.g. allowing SQL (Structured Query 
Language) queries), also ensuring each PAT instance would 
operate with delegated authority. DM reads the data from the 
Data Lake and writes the data to ISI of the C3ISP Component 
or reads protected data from ISI.   
The ISI is designed to protect the data (e.g. through 
encryption or sanitization) and to store the protected data, so it 
does not possess the full range of data management 
functionality required by the user. The IAI of the C3ISP 
Component, by design, requests protected data from the ISI, 
 
Fig. 1. System Architecture 
performs analytics and returns the results to the ISI. In this 
case, if the user only wants to view or use the results generated 
previously, the user needs to request the results using PAT via 
the Portal and then the PAT at the back-end requests the DM 
to fetch the results from ISI to complete the operation.  
The DM also mediates the Collaborative Task Manager 
(CTM) with the ISI.  When the CTM receives a request to 
perform an analytical operation using the IAI, the CTM will 
request the DM to check whether the data required by the 
operation is available or request the data source IDs. 
C. The Collaborative Task Manager 
The Collaborative Task Manager (CTM) works as the 
controller of the IAI and the middleware between non-C3ISP 
components and the C3ISP Component. The CTM can receive 
requests from the Portal, including configuration requests or 
task management requests; it can request the DM to check if 
the data requested by the task are available and if not, then ask 
the DM to read the data in; it can automatically invoke the 
PAT to request the data after the protected data are stored in 
the ISI. 
The CTM can work as an on-demand component. Here we 
give a real example to demonstrate the on-demand use of the 
CTM. If an enterprise requires all its shared data to be 
homomorphically encrypted using the C3ISP Component and 
then carry out algorithmic operations on the encrypted data, 
then the data request, the encryption request and the analytical 
request would be passed into the CTM through the Portal. The 
CTM subsequently requests DM to fetch the data. The DM 
then communicates with ISI to homomorphically encrypt and 
store the data; the CTM also requests the IAI to perform 
algorithmic operations on the encrypted data once the data are 
encrypted. 
The CTM can also be programmed to perform automatic 
tasks without invocation. For example, if the task is to 
automatically display the data in the PAT every five minutes, 
the CTM would automatically control the data flow going 
through the C3ISP Component.  
III. COMPONENT DESIGNS DRIVEN BY USE CASES 
In this section, detailed component architectures are 
described for three typical use cases of using the C3ISP 
Component within the Enterprise MSS platform. For clarity 
and simplicity, the diagrams only show the required 
components determined by the operational processes which 
are defined by the use cases. Some of the MSS platform 
components were not shown in the System Architecture (Fig. 
1) but are shown in this section because those components are 
needed for a use case process, although they are not part of the 
C3ISP Component enabled platform design. 
A. Data policy control and storage 
This use case concerns a DPO from the MSSP who wants 
to specify sanitization and/or normalization measures, access 
and usage control policies and other policies in order to lower 
the sensitivity of the data from the customer he/she is 
representing. In this case, he/she needs to feed the platform 
with DSA so that the data are sanitized and/or normalized. 
Before starting this process, the DPO who is part of the MSS 
platform administrative personnel, has already received the 
data sharing policy request from the customer’s own data 
policy personnel via the customer support or account manager. 
The DPO will use the browser to log into the portal and 
write the data sharing agreement into DSAM within the C3ISP 
Component (Fig. 2). The use case represents the first step of 
the collaborative and confidential security information sharing 
proposed by the C3ISP project. This use case works as a pre-
existing step for the next two use cases. 
B. Security Analyst gaining insights from the shared data 
and subsequently transforming the operational process 
Compared to the first use case, this second use case 
considers a more complex scenario where a Security Analyst 
from the MSSP discovers new knowledge from the shared 
 
Fig. 2. Component design illustrating DPO enforcing the DSA 
data and subsequently transforms the threat operation. In this 
use case, the Security Analyst is responsible for managing 
multiple customers using the MSS platform with the C3ISP 
Component enabled. Now these customers have agreed to 
share their data using the C3ISP Component and the data have 
been protected and stored in the C3ISP subcomponents, as 
shown in the first use case, this particular use case does not 
require the analytics functions provided by the IAI of the 
C3ISP Component and therefore the CTM is not illustrated 
(Fig. 3). 
The Security Analyst now starts a new process to 
investigate and identify actual and potential threats using the 
newly shared data and updates the operational process for one 
or more of these customers. Without the C3ISP Component, 
for individual customers, the analyst would use the MSS 
Dashboard (e.g., Kibana [15]) as part of the PAT to read the 
data from the Data Lake and to monitor various threat metrics 
(e.g., top 10 blocked source IPs) and would use the analytics 
tool within the PAT to further investigate threats and 
anomalous events. With the C3ISP Component enabled, the 
analyst is ready to use the shared data to monitor or further 
investigate active or potential threats. 
The analyst uses a Web Browser to log in to the Portal and 
then uses the Portal to request the PAT. As described 
previously, the PAT will then request the DM to read the 
shared and protected data from the C3ISP Component. The 
C3ISP Component will ensure that the read operation 
complies with the corresponding DSA and the data are 
formatted correctly before passing to the DM. The analyst 
discovers some new knowledge from the shared data, e.g., 
gaining a global understanding from the shared data, noticing 
a commonly shared threat pattern among the sharing parties. 
The analyst then decides to use some of the new discoveries to 
transform the operational process. Compared to the system 
architecture, notice that the Rule Engine and the Ticket 
Management System are existing MSS platform components 
but were not previously presented as these existing 
components are not directly or indirectly related to the C3ISP 
Component embedding.  
With the new insights, the analyst uses the Portal again to 
add a new rule into the Knowledge Base via the Rule Engine. 
The Knowledge Base stores the threat information or pattern 
which determines the operational rules (e.g. if more than a 
certain number of systems are reported with malware, it 
implies there is an important malware attack and needs to 
trigger an alert). The Rule Engine works as a controller of the 
Knowledge Base and connector of the ticketing and alerting 
components. The Rule Engine also needs to communicate 
with the DM to check if the (shared) data are relevant to any 
of the rules. The Rule Engine reads from and writes to the 
Knowledge Base and checks the data regularly through the 
DM to see if any rule is triggered. If a rule is indeed triggered, 
the Rule Engine then automatically creates a new ticket in the 
Tickets Database, and Ticket Management can also trigger an 
automatic alert with the new ticket being added via the Alert 
Notification system, e.g. automatic e-mail. 
For new knowledge where an automatic process is not 
suitable, the analyst can also log into the Ticket Management 
system via the Portal to create a new ticket or modify an 
existing ticket and to alert the customer. 
C. Security Operations Executive investigates the situation 
using the C3ISP shared data  
This use case concerns a Security Operations Executive 
(SOE) from the customer side, who wants to use the Analytics 
Tool to investigate the shared data, in addition to analyzing 
his/her company’s own data. In this use case, the investigation 
tasks also require usage of the analytical subcomponents of the 
 
Fig. 3. Component design illustrating Security Analyst analyzing shared data and managing threat monitoring 
C3ISP Component (e.g., using the analytical components 
within IAI to use homomorphically encrypted data).  
Here are the required operations before this particular use 
case can be applied. Before the SOE starts the new 
investigation, the DPO from the MSSP side has already 
attached the data sharing agreement to the data so that the data 
was protected and stored in the ISI and ready for use; the 
Security Analyst admin from the MSSP side has also 
configured the CTM so that the data can be analyzed using the 
C3ISP Component in an automatic process. As described 
before, the SOE does not control CTM, so CTM is not 
connected to the Portal. Figure 4 shows the FMC block 
diagram of this use case.  
At the front end, the SOE uses a Web Browser to log in to 
the Portal and instructs the Analytics Tool to retrieves his/her 
company’s own data and the shared data via the corresponding 
DM instance, which reads from the C3ISP Component 
regularly to ensure that the presented shared data is always up-
to-date.  
At the back-end, the CTM requests the IAI to perform the 
required functions on the shared and protected data from 
multiple enterprise customers (e.g. applies algorithmic 
operations on the homomorphically encrypted data) and stores 
the analytics results as the new protected and shared data in 
the ISI in an automatic manner. Any newly shared and 
protected data from ISI will be passed to IAI for analysis and 
the new data after analysis will be returned to the ISI 
automatically. The CTM may request specific information 
from DM about the customer data, e.g., requesting the IDs of 
different data sources.  
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a new system architecture and detailed 
component designs required by different user processes for 
collaborative and confidential data sharing. This addresses the 
current gap in security information sharing within a MSS 
environment for large-scale enterprises and organizations.  
As presented in the use cases, the possible scenarios and 
MSS environment are complex and therefore the way the 
different components are integrated also shows a certain level 
of complexity. The security analysts on the MSSP side and the 
SOE on the customer side, therefore need to develop new 
practices and process in order to make use of the shared data. 
Nevertheless, we have made every effort to simplify the 
complexity from an end-user experience perspective. 
Another challenge in sharing data within the MSS platform 
environment is that the MSSP processes a large amount of 
data on a daily basis. How to make the best use of such data if 
shared would also need to be explored and experimented on.  
This paper provides an innovative and concrete attempt to 
address the absence of architecture and designs allowing 
security data sharing on a MSS platform within the Enterprise 
environment. With an agile approach and strict privacy and 
confidentiality enforcement, we hope our research inspires 
more work in this area and makes collaborative and 
confidential data sharing achievable and manageable. 
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